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Abstract 
 
This paper outlines the ideas of Ralph Hawtrey and Lauchlin Currie on the need for 
monetised fiscal deficit spending in 1930s USA to combat the deep depression into 
which the economy had been allowed to sink. In such exceptional circumstances of 
“credit deadlock” in which banks were afraid to lend and households and business 
afraid to borrow, the deadlock could best be broken through the spending of new 
money into circulation via large fiscal deficits. This complementarity of fiscal and 
monetary policy was shown to be essential, and as such indicates the potential power 
of monetary policy – in contrast to the Keynesian “liquidity trap” view that it is 
powerless This lesson was not learned by the Japanese authorities in their response to 
the asset price collapse of 1991-92, resulting in a lost decade as ballooning fiscal 
deficits were neutralised throughout the 1990s by unhelpfully tight monetary policy 
with the Bank of Japan refusing to monetise the deficits. 
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In this paper, inspired particularly by David Laidler’s work in the field of monetary 
theory and policy, I shall compare the mistakes of monetary policy before and during 
the Great Depression in the United States in the 1930s with the conduct of monetary 
policy in Japan since the late 1980s.  
 
For the United States, my analysis will draw heavily on the contemporary 1930s 
writings of Lauchlin Currie (1902-93) whose biography I completed in 1990 
(Sandilands 1990) which led to a fruitful correspondence with Laidler on Currie’s 
monetary economics. This stemmed initially from his review article on Karl Brunner 
(Laidler 1991). David was surprised to learn of Brunner’s close connection with 
Currie and that he had written a lengthy introduction to the reissue of The Supply and 
Control of Money in the United States (Currie 1934a [1968]). It was this and several 
related papers, notably “The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 
1929-32” (Currie 1934b),1 that induced Jacob Viner, then a special adviser at the US 
Treasury, to invite Currie to join a young Treasury group known as the “Freshman 
Brain Trust” for the summer of 1934. Currie’s remit was to develop the proposal for a 
100 percent reserve banking system that he had made in his recent book, and devise 
what would be, in the absence of any political obstacle to its implementation, “the 
most perfect banking system for the United States”.  
 
100% money, as this scheme became known, was indeed a political non-starter, but its 
main logic – the need to gain firm control over bank reserves for effective control of 
the supply of money, hence the business cycle – was the inspiration for the 1935 
Banking Act that was to establish a true central bank for the United States and shift 
the power base of the Federal Reserve System from New York to Washington. For at 
                                                 
1 Selected by Harry Johnson for a volume of 24 “landmark” articles from the Journal of 
Political Economy (Hamilton et al., 1962) and by Laidler for inclusion in Foundations of 
Monetary Economics (Laidler, ed., 1999). It was reported to Currie (as told to me by him) that 
Johnson chose this paper for the Landmarks volume because of the neglect of his work by 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their forthcoming Monetary History of the United 
States (1963) whose diagnosis of 1929-33 was largely anticipated by Currie. Similar criticism 
of Friedman’s neglect, and distortion of the historical record, came later from Don Patinkin 
(1969). Laidler extended this discussion in his “Hawtrey, Harvard and the Origins of the 
Chicago School” that appeared in the JPE in December 1993, the same month as Currie’s 
death. The current paper attempts to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Currie’s and 
Ralph G Hawtrey’s insights into the essentially monetary nature of the business cycle.  
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the Treasury Currie met Marriner Eccles who was soon to be the new governor of the 
Fed, taking Currie with him.  
 
Currie’s views on monetary and fiscal policy as the way out of depression had found 
little favour among the senior professors at Harvard, and when he applied for a further 
leave of absence at the Treasury (initially to be Viner’s assistant) this was denied. So, 
somewhat embittered, he resigned from Harvard and his three month stint in 
Washington would extend to 11 years – at the Treasury, the Fed, and, from 1939-45, 
as President Roosevelt’s administrative assistant for economic affairs in the White 
House. He moved with Eccles to the Fed in November 1934 and they immediately 
drafted what was to become the 1935 Banking Act. 
 
On Currie’s contributions to monetary theory and policy in the depression years, 
Brunner (1968: ix-x) wrote:  
[He] was among the pioneers in our field in assembling and assessing data on the 
money stock. He fully appreciated that meaningful analysis cannot proceed in the 
absence of reliable data. This pioneering work eventually forced the Federal 
Reserve Authorities to develop suitable monetary data on a broader scale, and 
particularly collect and publish data bearing on the nation’s money stock.  
 
He added (p.xxiv): 
Currie’s systematic discussion of policy issues considers also some notions often 
repeated by the Federal Reserve authorities… Many believed that the Federal 
Reserve had tried to stem the deflationary tide of the preceding years by means of 
an expansionary policy. The experience was interpreted as a demonstration that 
monetary policy was useless… Currie shows that this belief is a myth… The 
examination reveals not inability to exert influence but a persistent inactivity and 
drift. Open market policy and acceptance policy were not used to raise the 
monetary base. His analysis shows that the Federal Reserve authorities could have 
effectively prevented the collapse in the monetary stock during the Great 
Depression. 
 
In this paper I explore some intriguing parallels between Currie’s analysis of Fed 
policy in the turbulent years after the 1929 Wall Street crash and recent debates on 
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Bank of Japan policy during the protracted ‘growth stagnation’ period that followed 
Japan’s asset market crashes of 1990-91. In particular, controversy focuses on (i) how 
far central bank policy should be influenced by asset price inflation; (ii) the 
appropriate role of the central bank as lender of last resort to the commercial banking 
system in the face of mass liquidation of debts and non-performing assets; (iii) the 
criteria for judging whether monetary policy has been active or acquiescent; (iv) the 
alleged impotence of monetary policy and whether there exists a Keynesian ‘liquidity 
trap’ or whether instead the problem has been more like a Hawtreyan ‘credit 
deadlock’; (v) the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy in recovery from 
severe deflation; and (vi) the significance of a build-up of excess bank reserves.  
 
I turn first to Currie’s diagnosis of the causes of the Great Depression, drawing partly 
on Sandilands (2004). 
 
Federal Reserve policy, 1927-41, and Hawtrey’s concept of “credit deadlock” in 
a monetary theory of the cycle 
 
As Thomas Humphrey (1971), Laidler (1993, 1999), and Frank Steindl (1995) have 
explained, Currie’s publications in the early 1930s presented a diagnosis of the 1929-
32 collapse in the United States economy that was substantially the same as that 
advanced by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), as Friedman has since acknowledged 
(see his mea culpa in Laidler, 1993, p.1077, n.12). 
 
In his “restatement” of the quantity theory of money, Friedman (1956) had contended 
that there was a unique Chicago oral tradition that made Chicago relatively immune to 
the Keynesian “virus”, and that his own restatement was in that Chicago tradition. 
This sparked heated debate on the nature of that tradition: whether it was unique, and 
whether Friedman’s restatement was closer to that tradition or to the “Cambridge” 
tradition of Marshall, Pigou and Keynes (especially the pre-General Theory Keynes), 
as Patinkin (1969, 1981) maintained.   
 
Evidence relevant to this was later found in a January 1932 Harvard memorandum on 
anti-depression policy written by Currie, Paul Theodore Ellsworth, and Harry Dexter 
White (2002 [1932]). On seeing this document Friedman again retreated (in a letter 
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reproduced in Laidler and Sandilands, 2002, p.518) from his earlier position on the 
supposed uniqueness of the Chicago tradition; see also Robert Leeson (2003) and 
John Smithin (2004). The 1932 memorandum indicted recent monetary, fiscal, tariff 
and reparations policies for causing the 1929-32 collapse, and called for a drastic 
reversal of these policies, including substantial open market bond purchases together 
with so-called “fiscal inflationism” – a deliberate increase in the fiscal deficit financed 
by monetary expansion. This was seen as a necessary feature of a reactivation 
programme if crowding-out effects from public expenditures were to be avoided and 
aggregate monetary expenditures increased.  
 
In this the memorandum was close to the position taken at that time by Hawtrey 
(1929, 1931) whose assistant Currie had been during Hawtrey’s year at Harvard in 
1928-29, and close also to the position said by Friedman to be characteristic of a 
unique Chicago tradition. For example, the memorandum stated: “Our banking policy 
has not exerted any effective influence to check the decline in the means of payment. 
Instead of offsetting the decline in the demand for goods caused by the decreased rate 
of spending, our policy has intensified it by permitting a contraction of the volume of 
the means of payment.” By 1931 the deflationary forces had gone too far to be 
reversed through purely monetary actions:  
With confidence as badly shaken as it is at present, and with prices continuing to 
fall, there is little in the current outlook to make it attractive to business men to 
borrow in amounts sufficient to stimulate recovery… Since the initiation of a 
voluntary program of expansion by independent, scattered producers must wait 
upon the appearance of the prospect of profits, and since the Federal Government 
is the sole agency in a central position and strong enough to undertake drastic 
remedial action, it is strongly recommended that the government immediately 
commence a program of public construction on a nationwide scale… This 
program should be financed, not by taxation, which serves principally to divert 
expenditures from one channel to another, but by an issue of bonds… eligible for 
rediscount at the Federal Reserve Banks, and also as collateral for the issue of 
Federal Reserve notes (Currie, Ellsworth and White, 2002 [1932], p.540).  
 
The publication of this document in 2002, together with several of Currie’s hitherto 
unpublished memoranda on recovery policy published in Sandilands (2004), shone 
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new light on the pre-1936 intellectual antecedents to Keynes’s General Theory that 
had already been ably discussed in Laidler’s Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution 
(1999), with its apposite double entendre. And as Laidler wrote to me in August 2003: 
“Until the profession gets it straight that the post-war macroeconomic policy 
consensus had as many (more?) roots in the original work of the New Dealers as it did 
in JMK's efforts, its understanding of its own history will be defective.” 
 
Currie’s unpublished Harvard Ph.D thesis on Bank Assets and Banking Theory 
(January 1931) was a clear antecedent both to the January 1932 memorandum on anti-
depression policies, and to his later recommendations on reform of the United States 
banking system.2 In the opening chapter he outlined the history of the Banking and 
Currency Schools debate to show the importance of the composition and control of 
bank assets. It reveals that if the central bank automatically accommodates ‘self-
liquidating’, short-term commercial loans (‘real bills’) then this could be dangerously 
pro-cyclical.3 Furthermore, commercial loans were not the most liquid or marketable, 
and if banks are forced to hold too large a portion of their assets in this form they may 
end up with excess reserves (that is, they would not be fully loaned up).  
 
He later explained why excess reserves can frustrate the central bank’s ability to 
control the nation’s money supply, hence the business cycle. Adherence to the real-
bills doctrine had, in his view, led the Federal Reserve Board in 1929 to be 
excessively preoccupied with banks’ security loans and stock market inflation, hence 
to a tightening policy at the very moment when the real economy was moving into 
recession. Currie referred to this doctrine as the ‘commercial loan’ or ‘needs of trade’ 
theory of central bank policy, in which banks’ short-term ‘productive’ loans were 
prudent and non-inflationary while long-term security loans were speculative, 
imprudent and a recipe for boom and bust in stock markets and the real economy. He 
                                                 
2 A revised version of the thesis was submitted for the Wells prize in October 1932. It initially 
tied with H D White’s thesis on the French balance of payments, but Currie’s supervisor, John 
H. Williams, told him that when they were given for adjudication to Gottfried Haberler, then 
a visitor to Harvard, Currie’s was rejected because he was known in other contexts to have 
“unsound” views on unbalanced budgets. His views contrasted sharply with what Laidler 
(1999, p.47) termed the “policy pessimism verging on nihilism” of the Austrian School. 
3 A critique of the influence of the real bills doctrine on Fed policy in the 1920s and early 
1930s runs through Allan Meltzer’s (2003) recent history of the Federal Reserve, as 
highlighted by Laidler’s (2003c) review. 
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blamed this theory for inducing the Fed to raise interest rates in early August 1929, 
and for then conducting an essentially passive monetary policy during the 1929-32 
period of mass liquidations and economic contraction (see especially Currie 1934a 
and 1934b, pp.146-48). In other words, for its failure to use fully its lender-of-last-
resort responsibilities at a time of crisis. 
 
A popular view is that a ‘speculative orgy’ on Wall Street was the prime cause of the 
great depression. According to the commercial loan theory, security loans diverted 
credit from more productive uses, thereby denying the ‘legitimate needs of industry’. 
Currie disputed this claim. First, he found that interest rates were only weakly related 
to stock market activity but strongly related to restrictive Fed policies, and in 1929 
these were more severe than any since 1921, made worse for being applied when 
recession was already under way. Second, banks’ security loans were only a small 
proportion of all security loans. The majority were effected via brokers in the stock 
market clearing house, thus requiring little net use of bank deposits. And an 
examination of individual stock prices revealed a considerable degree of rational 
selectivity (rather than ‘irrational exuberance’) based on the differing earnings record 
and potentials.4     
 
In his 1931 thesis, and in line with his criticism of the commercial loan theory, Currie 
endorsed, with qualifications, Hawtrey’s monetary theory of the business cycle. 
Hawtrey stressed the ‘inherent instability of credit’,5 due to the sensitivity of 
                                                 
4 Currie’s views on stock prices in 1929 find confirmation in Santoni (1987). For further 
discussion of his views on the (relatively minor) impact of stock market prices on the circular 
flow of income via the wealth effect on savings, see Sandilands (1990, pp.35-37).  
5 Hawtrey defined ‘credit’ as demand deposits. In the 1932 version of his PhD thesis, Currie 
deleted almost all reference to this word on the grounds that the term was too ambiguous. 
Currie’s chapter IV, “Credit in Contemporary Monetary Theory” (also Currie 1933), explains 
the problem. Banks can extend ‘credit’ (loans and investments) on the basis of both demand 
and savings deposit liabilities, and from borrowings from reserve banks when the public’s 
demand for currency increases. And in 1928-29 the Federal Reserve Board included security 
loans made by non-banks, as would be logical if by credit is understood loans and 
investments and if this is the control target (Currie 1934b, p.49). This ‘credit’ series can 
increase at very different rates than the supply of money (currency plus demand deposits). 
Regarding 1927-29, he wrote: “The belief that ‘credit’ was expanding rapidly was based on 
figures for loans and investments. The index of the entire money supply… indicates that the 
rate of expansion was less than that of production and the rate of expansion was declining 
steadily from June, 1925” (Currie 1934a, p.166).  
   For unknown reasons much of Currie’s discussion of Hawtrey’s cycle theory was deleted 
from the 1932 version of his thesis in favour of further allusions to Keynes’s 1930 Treatise on 
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wholesalers and merchants (more than manufacturers) to changes in the short-term 
rate of interest. The rate naturally falls in a depression when demand for commercial 
loans is low, and vice versa in the upswing. With a fall in demand for loans there is a 
fall in output, incomes and expenditures (effective demand) until declining interest 
rates arrest and then reverse the fall in loan demand. In the upswing, rising incomes 
increase the public’s demand for cash. This squeezes the banks’ reserves and interest 
rates rise. Eventually this arrests and then reverses the upswing – in the absence of 
astute counter-cyclical policy by the central bank.  
 
Currie offered several criticisms of Hawtrey’s monetary theory but stressed that none 
was fatal. In particular, he argued that banks are able and willing to expand and 
contract their holdings of (relatively marketable, hence liquid) securities, stocks and 
bonds to compensate for opposite movements in the demand for (relatively illiquid) 
short-term commercial loans. Furthermore, this ability to vary their asset holdings 
(hence their deposit liabilities) is a more important counter-cyclical influence than 
variations in the short-term interest rate. For the demand for commercial loans is 
lowest when demand for goods is lowest, and in those circumstances a lowering of 
short-term rates will not compensate. Earlier in his thesis, Currie wrote: 
If business men were as sensitive to short-term interest rate changes as Mr. 
Hawtrey seems to believe, commercial loans could be easily expanded by a fall in 
rates and contracted by a rise. A contrary view, however, which corresponds more 
closely to reality, is that the cost of short-term borrowing is not an important 
consideration in the calculation of borrowers. Of much more importance is the 
actual and anticipated demand for goods. If business conditions are receding, a fall 
in the short-term interest rates will not induce manufacturers and traders 
voluntarily to accumulate inventory. It is precisely at such a time that they are 
most eager to reduce inventories. This is one of the reasons why the movement of 
interest rates and commercial borrowings have a direct rather than an inverse 
relation to one another (Currie 1931, p.86).6  
                                                                                                                                            
Money. See also Laidler (1999 chs. 5 and 9) on Hawtrey’s links with Allyn Young, Currie and 
the Chicago school.  
6 Cf. Allyn Young in a 1928 LSE lecture (published in Mehrling and Sandilands 1999, p.387):  
During the depression reserves accumulate in the bank so that interest rates fall. Now do 
not these falls in interest rates attract industrial enterprise until industry expands again? 
(cff. Keynes, Cassel, Hawtrey.) But actual industrialists (and bankers) deny that 
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 By taking the initiative in buying and selling a wide range of assets the banks could 
better maintain the money supply and so exert a stabilizing influence on business.7 
Elsewhere, Hawtrey did acknowledge this. In Trade Depression and the Way Out 
(1931, p.44), he wrote that “the acquisition of any asset by banks [as opposed to non-
banks] involves the creation of new bank credit [the key variable in his cycle theory]. 
Investment securities provide a very convenient vehicle for the creation of credit, 
because they can readily serve as collateral for bank advances”.  
 
In an earlier passage entitled “Deadlock in the Money Market”, Hawtrey (1931, 
pp.30-33) examined the role of open market operations by the central bank to 
supplement variations in its bank rate. In a normal, moderate depression low rates 
would suffice to revive business. On the other hand, if conditions are allowed to 
deteriorate, a ‘credit deadlock’ could emerge in which lenders are too afraid to lend 
and borrowers too afraid to borrow – a case of an unusually inelastic demand for and 
supply of loans with respect to the short-term rate of interest.8 In Hawtrey’s 
explanation there is even a hint of what, in the recent Japanese context, has come to 
be called “the zero lower bound problem” in which no practical reduction in short 
rates could, by itself, effect recovery:  
[I]f the depression is very severe, enterprise will be killed. It is possible that no 
rate of interest, however low, will tempt dealers to buy goods. Even lending 
money without interest would not help if the borrower anticipated a loss on every 
conceivable use that he could make of the money. In that case the purchase of 
securities by the Central Bank, which is otherwise no more than a useful 
reinforcement of the low Bank rate, hastening the progress of revival, becomes an 
essential condition of the revival beginning at all. By buying securities the Central 
Bank creates money, which appears in the form of deposits credited to the banks 
                                                                                                                                            
variations in the rate of interest influence the extent of their operations, providing their 
competitors pay the same. It is the “market” on which they count. 
   Likewise, cf. Currie (1931, p.214) on Hawtrey: “It has not been difficult for his critics to 
show that traders are more influenced by the state of the market than by interest rates.” 
7 This is one reason why Currie favoured nationwide branch banking and opposed the 
provision in the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that prohibited commercial banks from dealing in 
corporate securities.   
8 Not to be confused with a Keynesian ‘liquidity trap’, discussed below, in which the demand 
for money is supposed to be highly elastic with respect to the long-term rate of interest. 
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whose customers have sold the securities. The banks can thus be flooded with idle 
money, and given a new and powerful inducement to find additional borrowers 
Hawtrey, 1931, pp.30-31).  
 
Elsewhere, Hawtrey goes further and – consistent with Currie, Ellsworth and White 
(1932 [2002]) above – argues that fiscal deficits arising from public works can be an 
effective supplementary measure to revive a deeply depressed economy, but only if 
the deficit is financed by money creation, for otherwise private sector spending would 
usually be crowded out (the famous 1929 “Treasury View” that originated with 
Hawtrey). When deficits were financed by money creation, it was this money, and not 
any direct expenditure associated with fiscal policy, that would do the work (Laidler 
and Sandilands, 2002, p.524). Later, we shall return to this argument in the context of 
recent Japanese macroeconomic policy. 
 
Here is Hawtrey on the ‘credit deadlock’ in Currency and Credit (1950 edition, 
p.75)9: 
When the vicious circle of depression takes hold, and traders find their efforts to 
keep down their stocks defeated by too rapid decline in sales, the relaxation of 
credit may find them so burdened with unsold goods that no facility of borrowing 
can induce them to add to their stocks. A deadlock results, productive activity 
failing to respond to cheap money… 
   If the banks fail to stimulate short-term borrowing, they can create credit by 
themselves buying securities in the investment market. The market will seek to 
use the resources thus placed in it, and it will become more favourable to new 
                                                 
9 Laidler (2004b, p.12) noted that by 1932 Hawtrey could not fail to see that a lowering of the 
short-term interest rate would need to be supplemented by open market bond purchases. 
Hawtrey (1932, p.173) wrote that these should be on whatever scale was necessary to break a 
credit deadlock and the vicious circle of deflation, for “there must ultimately be a limit to the 
amount of money that sellers would hold idle”. It is noteworthy that even at this late date 
Hawtrey did not stress fiscal deficits as an essential policy ingredient for expanding the 
monetary circulation (unlike Currie, Ellsworth and White [1932]). He seems to have regarded 
fiscal deficits as useful but inessential in breaking a deadlock. Patrick Deutscher (1990, p.67) 
noted that Hawtrey “never renounced the position that eventually profitable opportunities 
would be found and exploited by capitalists as long as credit remained accommodating”. He 
also (p.68) quotes Hawtrey as writing that “People do not have an unlimited desire to hold 
idle balances. Because they already hold more than usual, it does not follow that they are 
willing to hold still more.” Further expansion of money “is bound ultimately to reach a point 
at which demand responds”. However, Hawtrey did not stress that this may take much longer 
than if the money is spent directly into circulation by government. 
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flotations and sales of securities. But even so an expansion of the flow of money is 
not ensured. If the money created is to move and to swell the consumers’ income, 
the favourable market must evoke additional capital outlay. That is likely to take 
time and conceivably capital outlay may fail to respond. A deficiency of demand 
for consumable goods reacts on capital outlay, for when the existing capacity of 
industries is underemployed, there is little demand for capital outlay to extend 
capacity… 
   The deadlock then is complete, and, unless it is to continue unbroken till some 
fortuitous circumstance restarts activity, recourse must be had to directly 
inflationary expedients, such as government expenditure far in excess of revenue, 
or a deliberate depreciation of the foreign exchange value of the money unit. 
 
Currie’s (1931) related argument was that even when banks are limited by inadequate 
demand by business for long-term loans, they may, by quoting sufficiently high 
prices, induce holders of old issues to part with their holdings.10 By driving down the 
long-term interest rate, this may induce issue of new securities; and “loans for fixed 
capital purposes is the very best way in which credit can be created in times of 
depression. What is needed is that consumers’ incomes should be increased with no 
corresponding immediate increase in finished consumer goods” (p.218). Likewise, if 
banks promote a strong bond market this might not only improve business sentiment 
but “would at least furnish those public authorities who are in favor of an expansion 
of public works with an additional argument. In so far as the policy of expanding 
public works in times of depression is adopted, and banks purchase bonds of public 
authorities, the additional bank credit will be spent directly and will not involve any 
decrease in the spending ability of private individuals” (p.236). 
 
However, the supply of high-grade bonds (including those issued by public authorities 
and foreign borrowers) may be inadequate (in the absence of substantial bond-
financed public works) to meet the requirement of banks; and if their purchases of old 
bonds “do not stimulate new issues the long-term interest rate may decline to a point 
                                                 
10 Currie notes elsewhere (1931, p.235) that “if banks took over security loans by quoting 
very low rates, the former lenders might, of course, be content to allow the deposits they 
received by the cancellation of their loans, to remain inactive”. He believed he was more 
conscious than Hawtrey that the public’s demand for inactive balances (or circuit velocity) 
varies pro-cyclically, and that this justifies further offsetting action by the central bank.  
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at which banks may, perhaps, prefer to maintain excess reserves rather than risk a 
future loss from depreciation when interest rates rise” (p.216). This was probably 
written in 1930 before a credit deadlock had fully taken hold, and he noted then that 
while this consideration does not seem to have deterred banks in the past – hence “the 
objection to the monetary theory of the business cycle which rests on the inability of 
the banking system to take the initiative in expanding credit, is by no means 
conclusive” (p.218) – it may conceivably do so in the future. 
 
Actually Currie (1934b, p.115) found that the figures  
do not bear out the common belief that excess reserves mount rapidly in times of 
depression. It is of particular interest that throughout 1930 and much of 1932, 
when the depression was probably worse than had ever before been experienced, 
excess reserves were but little larger than in 1929… The rapid increase in excess 
reserves in 1932 and again in 1933 occurred at highly abnormal times and should 
not be used as a basis for generalizations as to what might be expected to happen 
in the type of depression we had experienced up to that time. 
 
He concluded (p.124):  
[T]he demand for loans does not impose a very serious limitation on the volume 
of deposits. Unless the depression is abnormally severe banks can offset the 
decline in their commercial loans by increasing their investment portfolios, and 
our greatest hope in promoting business stability through monetary means lies in 
action taken before a depression becomes a disaster. 
 
Thus both the magnitude and the timing of monetary measures were crucial. Later 
Currie (1978, p.541) wrote:  
After the upturn in business in early 1930 proved abortive, I despaired of the 
efficacy of monetary measures in the conditions of the times and started both in 
my classes and in discussions advocating deficit spending. But this had to be done 
almost surreptitiously. Even so, the heresy became known and I fell from grace 
and was reprimanded by the Chairman of the Department. 
 
Effectively Currie had decided by the middle of 1930 that this was no ordinary 
depression. Even though excess reserves did not build up significantly until 1932 
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(indicating insufficient lending opportunities relative to reserves at that time), mass 
liquidations had earlier forced bank closures and surviving banks had been losing 
reserves to uncompensated cash drains. Thus both deposits and income velocity had 
been falling, with disastrous effects on income and demand for loans – a classic credit 
deadlock. In these circumstances open market operations were unlikely by themselves 
to revive lending and spending. If there is great excess capacity and a slump in the 
demand for loans, open-market purchases of bonds would initially increase the supply 
of money, but if that money is then put into liquid savings deposits (in banks or non-
banks) it would merely end up as idle, excess bank reserves, with no increase in the 
money supply as such.  
 
The later Keynesian concept of a highly elastic ‘speculative’ motive for holding idle 
money balances when the long-term interest rate had fallen to an abnormally low 
level was given as the reason for the ineffectiveness of open market purchases of 
bonds in a depression. A ‘liquidity trap’ (a term coined by a sceptical D H Robertson 
in 1940; see Laidler [1999, p.286], and Laidler [2004a, pp.336-39]) would render 
monetary policy useless.  
 
Currie criticised the Keynesian concept because the private non-bank sector could 
always avoid capital-value risk by placing savings in short-term interest-bearing bank 
and non-bank time deposits.11 If the proceeds from central bank purchases of 
securities go into time rather than demand deposits, the money supply would only 
                                                 
11 These latter were not part of Currie’s (nor Hawtrey’s) definition of money, though any 
reserve requirements against them – which Currie opposed – would indirectly affect the 
supply of demand deposits and be deflationary for that reason.  
   There could be a speculative demand for time deposits (this would be a demand for liquidity 
that interacts with the supply of interest-bearing assets to determine the rate of interest) but 
not for non-interest-bearing cash or demand deposits. It is the conventional demand for money 
(not liquidity) that interacts with the supply of money to determine prices and income. The 
demand for money (as a proportion of income), rises in a depression not for the Keynesian 
speculative motive but because the opportunity cost of money is low when interest rates are 
low. However, if income is falling the absolute demand for money will also fall, and this 
helps to keep interest rates depressed, so far as they can be depressed. So, paradoxically, if 
monetary policy is tight the interest rate can fall, while if the effect of a vigorous expansion of 
the money supply is to revive spending, the interest rate may rise. 
   Mauro Boianovsky (2004, p.97) also alludes to John Hicks’s criticism of  the Keynesian 
liquidity trap “with its simplified two-asset structure comprising ‘money’ (representing short-
term assets) and ‘non-money assets’”.  Laidler (1999, p. 284-85) also cites Viner on the wide 
range of assets available to satisfy liquidity preference, so “Keynes assigns to the desire for 
cash for hoarding purposes a grossly exaggerated importance”.  
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increase if the banks were then able and willing to increase their lending instead of 
accumulating reserves. In an acute depression this may not be possible for lack of 
available high-grade alternatives. In other words, a Hawtreyan type of credit deadlock 
required an expansion of the money supply that, as depression deepens, may only be 
possible via unconventional fiscal means. By contrast, a Keynesian liquidity trap 
supposedly meant that monetary policy was useless, while a pure fiscal policy, 
financed via sale of bonds, could work even with no new money.12  
   
Hawtrey (1931, p.31) noted at the time that the Fed resorted freely to open market 
purchases up to June 1930 but made no further considerable purchases until June 
1931 and “the holding of Government securities was not raised beyond the point at 
which it had provided the member banks with the means of reducing their rediscounts 
to a minimum”. Bank loans and the money supply declined.  
 
Large-scale withdrawals of gold from the USA around the time that Britain left the 
gold standard in September 1931 forced member banks into debt again.13 Currie 
(1934b, p.108) noted how the banks responded by selling bonds and calling loans. 
Bond prices fell drastically, followed by bank failures, increased hoarding of notes, 
more liquidation, more failures, more hoarding, and a severe contraction of money.  
 
On the importance of timing, Currie (1934b, p.146) wrote: 
If action is taken before the upswing in business has reached its peak a 
comparatively mild easing policy will be sufficient to stimulate investment [in the 
subsequent downswing]. If, on the other hand, action is delayed until business has 
acquired a considerable momentum on the downswing a drastic expansion of 
money is called for. If the depression has become so severe as to entail a 
widespread loss of confidence in the solvency of both corporations and banks it 
                                                 
12 As Laidler (2003a, p.10) expressed it: a credit deadlock prevents money being created, 
whereas in a liquidity trap money lies idle after it has been created. See also Laidler (1999, 
p.286). 
13 Laidler (1999, p.236) noted that Currie implicitly denied there was a liquidity trap, in the 
sense of the powerlessness of monetary policy per se, even up to 1932. The reserve banks did 
buy an unprecedented amount of bonds, but not enough to get banks out of debt and to offset 
gold outflows; and because reserves did not increase he characterised the reserve 
administration’s policy as “one of almost complete passivity and acquiescence”. (A fuller 
quotation is given below.)  
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may be impossible to bring about immediate utilization of any excess reserves 
given to member banks. 
   For the sake of straight thinking on the subject of control it is essential to 
interpret it in terms of the changing industrial situation. Many writers, 
unfortunately, fall into the error of applying conclusions true of banking control at 
one particular time to other occasions quite different. The existence of excess 
reserves in the latter part of 1932 and again in 1933 have given force to the oft 
repeated assertion that the central bank cannot bring about expansion of money in 
a period of depression. But the phrase “period of depression” is obviously not a 
precise one. There was, for example, less difference in industrial activity between 
the “depression” of 1930 and the “prosperity” of 1929 than there was between the 
former and the “depression” of 1932. It is, therefore, illegitimate to assume that a 
certain banking policy would be as effective in 1932 as in 1930, or, to put it 
differently, to assume that because reserves were not immediately and fully 
utilized in 1932 they would not have been utilized in 1930 (Currie 1934, p.146). 
 
He continued: 
Much of the current belief in the powerlessness of the reserve banks appears to 
arise from a complete misreading of the monetary history of 1929-32. It is 
generally held that the reserve administration strove energetically to bring about 
expansion throughout the depression but that contraction continued despite its 
efforts. Actually the reserve administration’s policy was one of almost complete 
passivity and quiescence (ibid, p.147). 
 
On the excess reserves question, Hawtrey (1950, p.84) also wrote that “much depends 
on the magnitude of the idle balances. If they are too considerable to be offset by 
increased advances to traders, the banks may create credit by purchase of securities. 
But they must buy at prices which investors are beginning to find unattractive, and by 
buying will force prices higher still.” At this point he alluded to Keynes’s General 
Theory in which, by thus driving down the long-term rate of interest, “an increased 
absorption of cash will then result” from the risk of capital depreciation when the long 
rate has reached its conventional minimum. Hawtrey acknowledged (1950, p.85): 
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When this minimum is reached, the market’s stimulus is exhausted. Even the 
banks will require a minimum yield; they are no more ready than others to tie up 
their money without any compensation.    
   But a state of things in which the investment market cannot by any means elicit 
sufficient active accumulation to use up current savings is not to be remedied by 
merely monetary means… If the desire to save encounters an insurmountable 
deficiency of forms of wealth capable of accumulation, there is a deep-seated 
breakdown of the economic system. 
   Then indeed recourse may be had to deficit finance, not necessarily public 
works… but any excess of public expenditure over revenue, to be covered by 
securities (yielding a minimum of interest) in which those addicted to saving can 
accumulate titles to wealth. 
 
What mattered then was the size of the compensatory direct injection of spending into 
the system by the government. This was totally inadequate during President Herbert 
Hoover’s watch to arrest the decline in business activity and, in Currie’s view, still 
inadequate after Roosevelt came to office in March 1933.   
 
Currie’s second (but still not fatal) criticism of Hawtrey’s cycle theory was that he 
placed too much stress on the supply of bank deposits and too little on movements 
into and out of cash, as well as on short-term variations in the “circuit velocity” of 
deposits and cash (purchasing power).14 Nonetheless fluctuations in the supply of 
purchasing power, and also in its secular trend, do exercise a profound influence on 
the business cycle. And if this be true then “it follows that the mechanism by which 
the volume of credit is expanded and contracted is also of significance” (1931, p.222).  
 
Currie goes on to state that “the study of credit movements in the business cycle 
involves an explanation of two problems: first, the forces affecting the reserves of 
member and non-member banks, second, the means by which banks are enabled to 
                                                 
14 However, Hawtrey (1925), reprinted in Hawtrey (1928) to which Currie’s 1931 thesis 
refers, acknowledged that government spending may, in a depression, be financed by 
borrowing from balances that lie idle, and that this could increase “the ratio of consumers’ 
income to the unspent margin” (i.e., money). This is another way of saying that the velocity 
of circulation must increase if public works are to increase employment in the absence of 
extra money.  
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adjust their deposits to their reserves” (ibid.). The latter problem is the focus of 
Currie’s PhD thesis on the links between the business cycle and the supply and 
control of various classes of bank asset. The former was more the focus of his 1934 
book on the control of the supply of money. There he examined the different reserves 
(legally required and otherwise) held by different classes of bank and different type of 
deposit during the various stages of the business cycle, and the often perverse or pro-
cyclical elasticity of the money supply that had resulted from that bank structure.  
 
In the concluding chapter of his 1931 thesis Currie referred to conditions in 1930 and 
complained that “[a]s long as the demand for commercial loans continues to decline 
the Board apparently sees no necessity of permitting the expansion of credit to take 
place” (pp.243-44). This was a recipe for pro-cyclical monetary policy that was to 
deepen the on-going depression. The Fed was too preoccupied with the composition 
and perceived relative productivity of bank assets, to the neglect of its primary 
function, that of controlling the overall volume of bank deposits:  
It is evident that the commercial loan theory of banking is incompatible with the 
view that the chief function of the banking system is to supply purchasing power, 
and that a central bank should control this supply in the interests not only of 
commercial borrowers, but of the community in general (p.242).  
Finally, he advanced a number of recommendations for amending the Federal Reserve 
Act, especially in respect of the question of bank assets eligible for rediscount (p.248), 
and of the need to relax the gold reserve requirement against notes. After he had 
teamed up with Marriner Eccles in 1934, he was to effect some of these measures, 
designed to convert a ‘perversely elastic’ banking system into an effective 
‘maladjustment-compensating factor’. 
 
Allan Meltzer (2003, pp.478-79) highlights Currie’s influence on Federal Reserve 
policy after 1934 but was puzzled by the contrast between his focus on monetary 
policy failures in his publications to 1934 and his focus on fiscal policy in his work 
with Eccles. He wrote: 
Eccles differed from his predecessors in his belief that government had to take 
responsibility for the economy. He devoted much of his time to advocating fiscal 
measures, especially increased spending on investment financed by government 
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borrowing to expand demand. Currie seems to have shared this view. Although he 
analysed the Federal Reserve’s failure to expand as a consequence of adherence to 
the real bills doctrine and neglect of the falling money stock, he does not seem to 
have pursued this view at the Federal Reserve. He devoted much of his research 
after 1935 to developing measures of fiscal thrust and the case for unbalanced 
budgets… Later, he described his 1934 book as “partly obsolete when it was 
published”… The reason he gave was that money (deposits) depend on member 
bank borrowing, and there was no borrowing. This is an odd conclusion. 
   
The puzzle is resolved by recognising the key conditions that make for effectiveness 
of monetary policy in the different phases of slump and recovery. To effect recovery 
from a slump, the Fed must first get member banks out of debt. This the Fed had 
failed to accomplish adequately in 1929-32. The policy of passive acquiescence to 
banks’ loss of deposits resulted in mass liquidations and a downward spiral into 
depression. An acute Hawtreyan credit deadlock then meant that banks could not find 
enough credit-worthy customers when eventually they were able to lend again, and so 
they accumulated substantial excess reserves. In such conditions monetary policy 
alone is, in the famous words of Marriner Eccles, like pushing on a string.  
 
Currie believed that the deadlock required not only vigorous open market operations 
but also an active fiscal policy to spend new and old money into circulation, just as 
he, Ellsworth and White emphasised in their January 1932 Harvard memorandum.  
 
Hawtrey was more lukewarm than Currie on the need for government expenditure and 
fiscal deficits as a way out of depression, though he did not deny their potential 
effectiveness. As noted above, Hawtrey (1925, in 1928, pp.110-11) had argued that in 
exceptional circumstances, where businesses were accumulating idle balances that 
could not find profitable outlets, the issue of bonds to finance government spending 
could increase the velocity of circulation and, even in the absence of new bank 
lending (creating new money), this could give additional employment. But “the case 
is completely transformed” in the case “where the government finances its operations 
by the creation of bank credits”, and would then definitely give additional 
employment, without crowding out. Nonetheless, “the same reasoning shows that a 
creation of credit unaccompanied by any expenditure on public works would be 
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equally effective in giving employment” (p.112). And it is only when a low bank rate, 
reinforced by the purchase of securities on the part of the central bank in the open 
market “has been tried and has failed, [is] there any case for recourse to Government 
borrowing. Personally, I have no doubt that by the former method it is possible to find 
an escape from depression, however severe” (p.113, italics added).15 
 
By contrast, as depression deepened in 1930, Currie argued that fiscal deficits had 
become essential to break the deadlock. From 1934 he pioneered (with Martin Krost) 
a “net Federal income-creating expenditure” series that indicated how different types 
of fiscal deficit could contribute to an expansion of the circular flow of money. In 
1933-37 this was through (i) the ways in which deficit financing helped the banks to 
make use of the reserves that accumulated as gold flowed in from abroad (their excess 
reserves may have been increased even more in the absence of these deficit financing 
opportunities); and (ii) the way deficit spending stimulated the private sector to make 
use of their idle balances to expand production.  
 
Hawtrey probably did not contemplate, in the 1920s, just how severe a depression 
could be. In his retrospective assessment of the 1930s Hawtrey (1950, pp.410-11), 
wrote:  
Conditions in the United States offered an exceptionally suitable opportunity for 
the application of this theory [that public works could give employment by 
creating credit and/or “may set stagnant cash balances in motion”]. The American 
banking system was becoming clogged with idle money. The New York 
rediscount rate had been reduced to 1½ per cent. in January, 1934, and remained 
unchanged till it was reduced to 1 per cent. in 1937. The excess reserves of the 
member banks… rose to $3000 millions. With this gigantic reserve of lending 
power, the banks still could not induce their customers to borrow. 
     
However, while “the banks created credit by taking a considerable part of the 
securities issued by the Government to meet the deficit”, he noted that the growth of 
money national income was slower than the growth of bank deposits. Thus the policy 
                                                 
15 He stressed that if government spending was to be invoked, then the impact on the 
necessary creation of credit would be far greater if it borrowed from the central bank rather 
than “ordinary banks”. 
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of “lavish public expenditure [that] came to be called ‘priming the pump’” had 
disappointing results, and “when the banking system has to be unceasingly inundated 
year after year, the analogy wears rather thin” (p.411).16 Hawtrey accepted that “we 
cannot suppose that the Government borrowings of $3000 millions a year… from 
1933 to 1937 were wholly without effect. But recovery was extremely slow.” Though 
unemployment fell from about 13 millions in March 1933 to 6 millions in 1937, this 
was still greatly in excess of the 1.5 millions in 1929. Hawtrey placed part of the 
blame on wage increases after 1933, and especially those in 1937 by which time: 
… the measures making for expansion were being deliberately slowed down. The 
budget deficit for 1937-38 was reduced to $1377 millions. The statutory reserve 
requirements of the banks were raised in 1936 so as to reduce excess reserves 
from the $3,105 millions that they had reached by August 1936… 
   A recession followed, and in 1938 unemployment was once again up to the level 
of July, 1933. Expenditure of $20,000 millions of borrowed money by the 
Government had been incurred in vain (ibid., p.412). 
 
Hawtrey noted that revival in Britain was achieved with no recourse to public works 
or budget deficits as an expedient for inducing a monetary expansion until 1937 when 
borrowing for rearmament started (just at the time of the unhelpful United States 
recession). He seemed to hint that the United States should have been able to achieve 
the same results without the government expenditures that “had been incurred in 
vain”.  
 
Fiscal deficits, excess reserves and the recession of 1937-38 
 
                                                 
16 See Sandilands (1990, pp.68-74) on Currie’s various descriptions of the government’s 
contribution to spending. He early abandoned the pump-priming analogy because it suggested 
that one short dose of government spending would be sufficient to revive the economic 
machine without further help. Depending on how private-sector offsets to saving were 
moving, he recognized that the government might have to keep pumping for some time. 
Sweezy (1971, p.118) described Currie’s ‘net Federal income-creating expenditure’ label as 
“a semantic triumph of the first magnitude. It brought out the common element in all the 
government’s fiscal operations. No one used to thinking in terms of the net contribution could 
advocate promoting recovery by increasing public works spending while at the same time 
cutting government salaries and raising tax rates”. See also Currie’s early 1935 memorandum, 
“Comments on pump priming”, published in Currie (1978).  
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This was not how Currie saw it. For him, Roosevelt’s budget deficits were the major – 
and essential – ingredient in recovery after 1933, and thus were not in vain. The 
raising of reserve requirements in 1936-37, while unhelpful was not the main source 
of trouble. Recovery could have been maintained, and the recession of 1937-38 
avoided, if the government’s net contribution had been maintained. His own estimate 
of the degree of fiscal contraction in 1937 was even greater than Hawtrey’s figures, 
based as it was on how individual components of the government budget added to or 
subtracted from the expenditure flow. He estimated the “net federal contribution” at 
over $4 billions in 1936 and less than $1 billion in 1937.17 Expenditures had been 
inflated in 1936 by a one-off accelerated payment of veterans’ bonuses, passed over 
the president’s veto, and deflated in 1937 by large payments into a national pension 
fund mandated by the 1937 Social Security Act. 
  
By mid-1936 it appeared that excess reserves posed a threat to effective control of a 
potentially inflationary recovery in the future. Open market bond sales would not 
reduce the money supply if purchased out of excess reserves. Effective deflation 
requires that the banks be forced to borrow, and then for their repugnance to 
indebtedness to induce them to curtail their lending. 
 
As loan demand picked up, excess reserves would allow banks to accommodate the 
demand without restraint. This would permit a multiple expansion of deposits which, 
together with a reversion to the historically higher average velocity of circulation 
could cause monetary expenditures (MV) to expand greatly in excess of any feasible 
increase in real national production. The expansion in the money value of national 
income (Py) would then mainly be via a rise in prices (P) than in real output (y). For 
this reason Currie advised Eccles to raise reserve requirements in late 1936 and early 
1937, but only as a precautionary measure. There was no deflationary intent. In fact, 
because of the continuing inflow of gold from Europe, the doubling of reserve 
requirements during this period still left the banks with substantial excess reserves at 
the end of the process, in the spring of 1937.  
 
                                                 
17 See his 1937 memorandum, “The decline in the Federal contribution to the growth in 
community expenditures”, in Sandilands 2004, p.330.  
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However, from the beginning of June 1937 recovery turned rapidly into an alarming 
recession. Real GDP would fall by 18% over the next thirteen months (Meltzer 2003: 
522). The unemployment rate rose from its best 1937 figure of 12.5 percent to about 
22.5 percent in the spring of 1938, including as unemployed those on emergency 
relief employment (Black, 2003, p.430). At the time few people blamed the monetary 
measures, though there was a slight increase in bond yields, from an all-time low of 
2.46 percent in early March to 2.8 percent in early April (after which they declined 
again). This had angered Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr., though it was a 
Treasury decision to sterilize gold inflows from December. He was worried that a rise 
in interest rates would increase the financial cost of the deficit, and he kept pressing 
Roosevelt to trim government spending and balance the budget. Eccles agreed that 
higher interest rates were undesirable and supported the Federal Open Market 
Committee’s decision in April to engage in compensatory open market purchases.  
 
There is no evidence that banks were suddenly denying requests for loans by business 
or government, or imposing stricter conditions as a result of the increased reserve 
requirements. Thus the modern focus on a supposedly inept monetary policy as the 
cause of the downturn in 1937 (see, for example, Steindl, 1995 and 2004, in support 
of Friedman and Schwartz’s 1963 view) may be misplaced. Meltzer (2003: 521-22) 
and Christina and David Romer (1989: 131-32) emphasized at least two non-
monetary forces acting to decrease output in 1937: the fiscal downturn, and the way 
the Wagner Act led to large inventory accumulations in anticipation of the labour 
market strife that did occur in 1937, coinciding with an end to inventory 
accumulations. They also note that the behaviour of reserve holdings ran counter to 
Friedman and Schwartz’s interpretation in that there was no discernible change in 
reserves as a fraction of deposits until December 1937, seventeen months after the 
first increase in reserve requirements was announced and after the declines in money 
and industrial production were largely complete. 
 
Currie admitted that probably the reserve requirements would not have been raised if 
the recession of 1937 had been accurately forecast.18 But he wrote that “this is a 
                                                 
18 Letter to author, August 2, 1988. His views on this were spelled out in a May 1938 speech 
to the Illinois Banking Association (“Some Aspects of Business and Banking Developments 
in 1936 and 1937”, in Sandilands, 2004).  
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different matter than holding the raising responsible for the recession. For that the 
very sharp, even drastic, reduction in the fiscal cash deficit is the more convincing 
explanation of the sharp decline in the rate of growth in sales and the consequent 
piling up of inventories.” He also noted that “few theorists would expect an 
immediate impact on incomes and sales to result from the small decline in deposits 
that took place, especially as there is such an other more convincing explanation of 
the causation of the fall in aggregate demand.”  
 
In his “Public Spending as a Means to Recovery” (August 1936) and “Stabilization of 
Purchasing Power through the Use of Public Credit” (December 1936), both in 
Sandilands (2004), Currie believed that the 1933-36 recovery would be sustained even 
if the then relatively substantial fiscal deficit should decline somewhat over the 
coming year. He did not anticipate the extent of the fiscal contraction that was to 
occur, nor the effects of the Wagner Act on labour costs, expectations, and inventory 
accumulations. However, these memoranda are important for showing Currie’s 
understanding of the essential relationship, in time of depression, between fiscal 
deficit and banks’ ability to lend, thereby ensuring continued increase of monetary 
incomes and expenditures until recovery could be self-sustaining – with declining and 
eventually negative fiscal deficits. 
 
Currie’s August 1936 memorandum, “Public Spending as a Means to Recovery” (in 
Sandilands 2004), noted the importance of fiscal deficits for the maintenance of bank 
lending up to that point: 
The volume of checking accounts in all banks, plus the demand deposits of the 
Government in commercial banks, expanded by $8 to $9 billion between June 
1933 and June 1936. Part of this increase was attributable to an increase in the 
banks’ holdings of Government guaranteed bonds, part to the deposit of incoming 
gold, and the major part to the increase in banks’ holdings of the public debt. The 
increase in the member bank holdings of $4.8 billion amounts to 43 percent of the 
increase in the gross public debt in this period.  
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Lester G Telser (2003) has emphasised the importance of the veterans’ bonus 
payments (mostly in 1936) on the buoyancy of recovery in that year, even though it 
was financed by borrowing from the public so that it did not change the money supply 
(p.240). He states that the fiscal deficit in June 1937 was less than a quarter of its June 
1936 level (p.238), with a correspondingly smaller impact on the economy in 1937. 
On Currie’s measure of the “net federal contribution”, the fall was even greater ($101 
million in June 1937 compared with $543 million in June 1936). This may be partly 
explained by the differing spending propensity of the veterans compared to those who 
financed their bonuses. 
 
In “The Decline in the Federal Contribution to the Growth in Community 
Expenditures” (October 1937, in Sandilands 2004), he showed that in the three years 
1934-36 the net contribution had been $3.2 billion, $3.1 billion, and $4.0 billion. 
These were sizable fractions of the growth of national income in those years: 
respectively $7.8 billion, $5.4 billion and $8.8 billion. In the eight months from 
February to September 1937, the Currie-Krost series showed that the net contribution 
had fallen to only $573 million ($68 million a month and still falling – it was 
estimated at only $37 million in September) compared to $2,789 million ($348 
million a month) in the same period of 1936. He warned that the government’s 
contribution to buying power, already insufficient to offset the slowdown in private 
expenditures, may well turn negative in the near future. 
 
On a Keynesian interpretation of the downturn in 1937-38, this fiscal reversal was a 
crucial causal factor. By comparison, variations in the degree of excess liquidity in the 
banks were of secondary importance. By cutting the federal deficit there was a fall in 
the supply of safe earning assets that the banks had previously relied on. They could 
not easily or quickly replace them with a corresponding increase in private sector 
lending, for the decline in government spending and the increase in tax and social 
security receipts were themselves depressing demand for private sector output. This 
naturally restrained private loan demand. These factors, rather than the raising of 
reserve requirements, may account for the diminution of demand deposits from mid-
1937 and the continued high level of excess reserves. 
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Telser (2001) also disputes Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) view that the 1937-38 
recession was caused by the raising of reserve requirements. He shows that there was 
no decline in bank lending to the private sector until the end of the first quarter of 
1938, hence higher reserve requirements could not explain the decline of business. 
The decline in banks’ earning assets was entirely in their holdings of government 
bonds. The changed composition of bank assets (as well as their decline) differed 
radically from the experience of the previous recessions of 1920-22 and 1929-33. But 
if this meant that the private sector was not starved of loans, the question remains: 
what did cause the 1937-38 recession in private business?  
 
Telser does not explicitly address this. Currie’s explanation, however, was that fiscal 
tightening of 1937 led to a much smaller supply of new and relatively riskless bonds 
for banks to purchase. Thus, even without an increase in reserve requirements they 
would have been liquidating maturing bonds. Also, they were inclined to sell bonds 
anyway because of profit-taking at the apparent end of a three-year bull run for bond 
prices that occurred in January 1936 even before the announcement of the rise in 
reserve requirements. In his May 1938 speech to the Illinois Banking Association he 
concluded:  
It seems reasonable to assume that the desire to take profits was the major 
motivating factor in bank sales of Government bonds, particularly since sales were 
engaged in by so many banks that possessed more than adequate reserves to meet 
the new requirements.  Moreover, had the purpose been merely to obtain reserves, 
banks could have reduced their holdings of short-term Government paper instead 
of liquidating long-term bonds. 
 
If banks had continued to buy bonds on secondary markets this would have increased 
the riskiness of their asset portfolio by further depressing interest rates. If they had 
maintained their assets by making more fresh loans to the private sector in place of 
loans to government, this would also have increased their risk, absent a strong 
increase in loan demand by credit-worthy customers. In other words, the economy 
still had not broken out of a state of credit deadlock, or self-sustaining growth, and 
was still dependent on direct injections of monetary expenditures by the public sector. 
There was some increase in private sector loans throughout 1937 but insufficient to 
compensate for the public sector’s decreased demand, especially as private profit 
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prospects were dented by the decline in the government’s “net contribution”. Thus if 
the Fed had not raised reserve requirements there would probably have been further 
accumulations of excess reserves.  
 
Nonetheless, the increased reserve requirements under these conditions could not 
have helped matters, and must partly explain why banks sold bonds to maintain their 
liquidity. Again, however, Currie gave greater weight, in his May 1938 Illinois 
address, to banks’ desire to avoid capital-value losses at the end of the bond market’s 
bull run, with the decline “initiated by municipal and Federal bonds in January [1937] 
before action with reference to excess reserves was announced.”19 He insisted that 
action on reserves would not have worsened the recession whose causes lay elsewhere 
– in the smaller deficit plus other non-monetary factors, notably the exceptional 
inventory accumulations in late1936 that would be worked off a few months later. 
 
Steindl (2004, p.66) has written that in his analysis of recovery Currie had abandoned 
the quantity-theoretic analysis that he had applied to the contraction of 1929-33: “He 
therefore did not see the recovery as the product of an increasing stock of money. For 
him, the quantity of money was now an endogenous variable, subject to the needs of 
business as it sought to borrow, thereby affecting deposits, money, and excess 
reserves.” The quantity theory’s identity (MV = Py) states that if velocity is constant 
then the value of national income (Py) will increase in line with M. But in the unusual 
conditions of the mid-1930s Currie feared that both velocity and money would be 
excessively pro-cyclical as and when a firm recovery was assured, since business and 
consumers would then be able and willing to draw down their substantial idle 
balances.20 Steindl’s belief that he showed little interest in the money supply after 
                                                 
19 This part of his Illinois speech was taken from a memorandum, “Causes of the Recession”, 
April 1, 1938, later published in Currie (1980 [1938], p.327). There he denied that monetary 
policy in 1936 or the rise in reserve requirements in January 1937 could “be held responsible 
either as an initiating or contributory factor in the recession. As events turned out it would 
have been perfectly safe to have postponed the rise in reserve requirements that occurred in 
March and May of 1937. This however, was not evident in January of 1937 and is an entirely 
different matter” (ibid., pp.328-29). 
20 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p.774) show that velocity averaged 2.3 between 1933-36, 
against 3.2 in 1925-29. In “Stabilization of Purchasing Power through the Use of Public 
Credit” (December 1936) and “Would a Further Expansion of Money be ‘Injurious’?” 
(January 1937), Currie showed velocity fairly steady during this period at just above 2. He 
thought that in the event of full recovery it would revert to a value close to, but a little below, 
its 1920s average of about 3. In fact velocity did not recover its 1920s values until the 1950s.  
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1934, is not borne out by his Federal Reserve Board memoranda, though it is certainly 
true that he continued to believe that monetary policy had then become relatively 
powerless as a recovery measure except in conjunction with a vigorously 
expansionary fiscal stance. Its role would remain a subsidiary or complementary one 
until full recovery had been firmly established.  
 
On November 8, 1937, WPA administrator Harry Hopkins arranged for his economic 
adviser Leon Henderson, together with Currie and Isador Lubin, Commissioner of 
Labour Statistics, to meet with President Roosevelt for an interview that lasted an 
unprecedented four hours (see Lash, 1988, pp.317-27). The New York Post reported 
the next day that “the four advisers minced no words in giving Roosevelt a hard-
boiled review of economic conditions and with equal bluntness and vigor they told 
him that a disastrous recession can only be averted by a resumption of big-scale 
Government spending.” The group laid a report before the president that showed that 
“in August, for the first time since 1931, the government took more out of the income 
stream than it poured back in… If the Government takes taxes away from workers or 
corporations and uses these in bookkeeping items, such as old age reserve accounts, 
gold purchases, debt retirement, etc., and the amount exceeds what is paid for men 
and materials, then there is a deficit. That is what is happening now.”  
 
In a speech to Congress a few days after his “Keynesian” seminar, Roosevelt asked: 
“What does the country ultimately gain if we encourage businessmen to enlarge the 
capacity of American industry to produce unless we see to it that the income of our 
working population actually expands sufficiently to create markets to absorb the 
increased production.” But in practice Roosevelt initially sided with Secretary 
Morgenthau’s call for a balanced budget “to restore confidence”. Disaster followed. 
Not until April 14, 1938, after the worst period of his long tenure in the White House 
and after a strong letter from Keynes in February, did Roosevelt at last ask Congress 
(over the continuing objections of the Secretary of the Treasury) for more than $3 
billion of spending or lending in the immediate future for relief, public works, 
housing and assistance to state and local governments (see Barber 1996, p.114; also 
Black 2003, pp.428-36). Economic recovery resumed. 
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The lasting legacy of the theoretical, empirical, and practical experience of the 
depression and war years was the February 1946 Employment Act. Its passage 
through Congress was stormy, and the original bill was much watered down. 
Nevertheless, a statute that affirmed governmental responsibility for “maximum 
employment, production and purchasing power” was a significant advance over the 
more limited mandate for government that, for example, was preferred by Irving 
Fisher and the Chicago School with their rules-based price stability goal for monetary 
policy and with fiscal policy aimed at low-level balanced budgets. The war itself 
accustomed people to higher and more progressive rates of taxation and government 
spending, and these were only partially retrenched in peacetime. This introduced a 
much greater degree of built-in stability by effectively increasing the marginal savings 
rate at the full employment level of income and expenditure.  
 
Postwar prosperity and the Japanese experience 
   
To the extent that these automatic stabilizers mitigate the business cycle and make 
credit deadlocks rarer, they may also have made monetary policy normally the most 
effective discretionary instrument for macroeconomic stabilization. And indeed, for 
the more developed countries, including Japan, there has been no repeat of depression 
on the scale and duration of the 1930s. Following recovery from World War II, Japan 
was labelled an economic ‘miracle’. Its average annual growth rate in the 1950s was 
an impressive 9.1 percent, and this rose further to 10.7 percent in the 1960s. It grew at 
a creditable average of 5.2 percent in the 1970s despite the world-wide OPEC crisis 
years. In the early 1980s, while the world was painfully unwinding inflation, her 
growth slowed to 3.0 percent (1980-84); but from 1985-90 it increased to 4.6 percent, 
about double the OECD average.21  
 
It was from late 1991 that Japan entered its long period of “growth stagnation” and 
abnormally high unemployment, from which only now (2006) does it appear to be 
emerging. While this poor record does not compare with the Great Depression in its 
intensity, it does in terms of its duration and abnormality. The annual average growth 
rate, 1992-2004, was a mere 0.7 percent (or 1.2 percent if the recovery years 2003-05 
                                                 
21 Figures in this paragraph were calculated from Maddison (2001, p.206). 
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are included), with four years in which growth was negative (see Table 1). This 
significantly underperformed both its previous post-war record and, for the first time, 
that of the rest of the OECD. During this period inflation averaged 0.2 percent, with a 
negative rate in seven of the years since 1995.  
 
There is also an interesting parallel between Japan in the years immediately preceding 
its Great Stagnation and the United States in the years before its Great Depression. In 
the US from 1922-29, annual average growth was buoyant but not necessarily 
unsustainable at around 4.7 percent. Population growth was 1.8 percent a year, wages 
grew by only 1.5 percent a year, and inflation was virtually zero. In the recovery from 
post-war depression, stock prices naturally rose strongly but were not obviously out of 
line with fundamentals. During the 5-year bull run from mid-1924 to the crash in 
October 1929 the Dow Jones index rose by about 250 percent, accelerating in 1928 
and 1929. On the first day of the crash, October 28, 1929, the index plunged by over 
12 percent, by nearly 30 percent over the next six days, and by mid-1932 it had lost 
another 80 percent. It did not regain its 1925 level until 1938. The rise and initial 
plunge in the market in the 1920s were very similar to the 5-year ‘Reagan’ bull run of 
mid-1982 to late 1987. On Black Monday, October 19, 1987, the Dow fell by a record 
22.6 percent. But the response of the Fed in 1987 was very different from 1929-33, 
the stock market soon recovered, and the crash had no more than a very temporary 
adverse effect on US growth.22  
 
In Japan from 1985-91, average annual growth was, as we have seen, running at a not 
unusual rate of 4.6 percent. The consumer price index had been rising by only 1.7 
percent a year. This was a period of recovery from the slower growth of the early 
1980s and it sparked a 6-year bull run on the stock market. The Nikkei index rose by 
nearly 300 percent: from 9,927 in January 1984 to a peak of 38,951 in January 1990. 
It then fell by nearly 40 percent over the year to January 1991 and by a further 30 
percent over the next two years, to 16,875 in January 1993. It continued to slide for 
another 10 years to its trough of 7,804 on May 1, 2003, before recovering to a local 
high of 17,498 on April 7, 2006 (similar to where it stood in 1986).  
 
                                                 
22 In the United Kingdom, a strong monetary response also averted recession but at the cost of 
an acceleration of inflation (the ‘Lawson boom’). 
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Along with the stock market bull run, and outrunning it by a year, was a real estate 
boom. Rising land values helped fuel the stock market in that bank loans for stocks 
were largely collateralised by them. The urban land price index for the six largest 
cities (base 1990 = 100) tripled from approximately 33 in January 1985 to a peak of 
107 in January 1991 before falling by 15.5 percent in 1991, 19.4 percent in 1992, and 
then sliding by around 10 percent a year for the next 10 years. A slight recovery was 
registered for the first time only in mid-2005 when the index stood at around 20.23    
 
A major difference between the behaviour of the late 1980s asset price boom in Japan 
and that of the United States in the late 1920s was the way in which the Bank of Japan 
(BoJ) put extreme pressure on commercial banks to meet high credit targets. Werner 
(2005, ch.20) provides compelling evidence that the secretive BOJ continued 
“window guidance” (a type of credit control) during the whole of the 1980s despite 
official pronouncements that credit controls were abolished in 1982. The “guidance” 
involved the BoJ insisting that commercial banks adhere strictly to specified sectoral 
as well as quantitative targets in their allocation of credit, and were heavily penalised 
for under-shooting targets that, in the 1980s were set quite high. Furthermore, the BoJ 
maintained the same size structure of banks and this made for a poor, non-competitive 
allocation of credit. From 1982-91 banks scrambled to meet loose credit targets by 
dropping their own preferred standards of credit-worthiness.  
 
Werner concludes that the BoJ bears responsibility for encouraging banks to lend 
recklessly on speculative real estate ventures, or to non-bank financial intermediaries 
who would then also channel funds to property speculators. He deemed most of these 
‘unproductive’, with more than a hint of the real bills doctrine underlying his critique 
of central bank policy (Werner, p.230). He favoured selective credit controls, but ones 
directed to ‘productive’ investment activities, believing these to be the only credits 
that promote real, non-inflationary growth. However, in this case there is strong 
evidence that the window guidance did indeed distort the allocation of funds and 
caused inflated asset prices to deviate from fundamentals to a far greater degree than 
was true of the United States in the 1920s or 1980s.24 Although the BoJ was not 
                                                 
23 Data from Japan Real Estate Institute (2006), and Bank of Japan (2005), p.66. 
24 Friedman (2005) compares monetary policy in the stock market boom and post-boom 
periods in (i) the United States in the 1920s-1930s, (ii) Japan in the 1980s-1990s, and (iii) the 
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granted formal independence from the Ministry of Finance until 1998, Werner (p.293) 
emphasised that, acting secretively through its Banking Department, the BoJ 
possessed a high degree of de facto independence over credit creation:  
The problem was not that bank lending was out of control. To the contrary, it was 
controlled almost perfectly by the Bank of Japan’s window guidance. Instead, the 
problem was the policy taken by the Bank of Japan in setting loan growth quotas. 
Since the Bank of Japan chose far larger quotas than banks thought necessary, 
compliance with window guidance meant that banks were forced to peddle their 
loans to real estate speculators… thus pushing up real estate prices (ibid., p.292). 
  
Real estate values were then used as collateral for further loans, which meant further 
purchases and sales, with sellers redepositing the proceeds. These would then be 
recycled as yet more new loans. Werner (p.184) notes that there was “a remarkable 
surge in financial and real estate transactions during the second half of the 1980s”. 
Thus the money supply did not have to increase rapidly for asset prices to soar while 
consumer prices were quite steady. The transactions velocity of money (sometimes 
referred to as money’s ‘financial circuit velocity’) is notoriously volatile. In the late 
1980s it was obviously spiralling while the more important and economically 
meaningful income velocity (demand for money as a proportion of GDP) remained 
fairly stable. Thus, just as Currie claimed for the US in the 1920s there is no strong 
evidence that stock market and real estate transactions were diverting money or credit 
from the circular flow of current GDP in Japan. From 1985-91, Table 1 shows that the 
BoJ’s preferred definition of money (M2 + CDs, which includes relatively low-
turnover time deposits) rose by an average annual rate of 8.6 percent. On the M1 
definition (currency plus demand deposits) the average growth was just 6.1 percent, 
consistent with a low inflation rate of 1.7 percent and real GDP growth of 4.6 percent, 
hence a constant and broadly satisfied demand for money. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
United States in the 1990s-2000s. He shows that in the 1980s boom, Japan’s monetary growth 
was faster than in either of the two US booms. And after the stock market’s peak, “money fell 
sharply in the first episode and so did nominal GDP; money growth stagnated in the second 
episode [Japan] and so did GDP; money grew at a rapid rate in the third episode and, after a 
brief lag… so did GDP” (pp.147-48).  
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Nevertheless, unlike US asset inflation in the 1920s and 1980s, Japanese asset prices 
may have been very little justified by underlying fundamentals. As indicated above, 
Werner (2005, p.294) blames unwise, aggressive window guidance, and concludes: 
Responsibility for the creation of the bubble of the 1980s, thus also for the bad 
debts of the banking system of the 1990s, and indeed the long economic slump 
that began in 1992, lies squarely with the Bank of Japan. This strengthens the case 
that any policies to deal with the bad debts and stimulate an economic recovery 
should also be paid for by the Bank of Japan. Thus the central bank could have 
purchased all bad debts of the banks at face value, thus eliminating them at no cost 
to society, as well as monetise fiscal stimulation or the recapitalisation of banks. 
 
The director of the Banking Department of the BoJ from 1986 to 1989 was Toshihiko 
Fukui who rose to be the BOJ’s deputy governor in 1994 and governor in 2003. He 
and his mentor, Yasushi Mieno, deputy governor of the BoJ from 1989-94 and 
governor from 1994-98, have both placed blame for the creation of the asset market 
bubble on the private sector and Fukui has demanded that private sector bank leaders 
take responsibility for the bad debt problem (Werner, 2005, p.294).  
 
In any event, good times not bad would be the appropriate time to fix problems of 
poor debt management and inefficient banking structure – which may have been 
endemic for a long period, in good times and bad, hence not obviously the main cause 
of recession. As it was, shortly after the asset bubbles burst, growth declined – to 1.0 
percent in 1992 and 0.3 percent in 1993. The economy continued to stagnate for the 
next 12 years. The bursting of the bubbles was a major shock to business and 
consumer confidence that naturally led to determined attempts to restore battered 
wealth holdings and provision for pensions. 
 
Interest rates and the money supply 
 
What were the macroeconomic (monetary and fiscal) policy responses? Table 1 
reveals the monetary response. In the critical year of 1992, the money supply (M1) 
grew by just 1.9 percent. The broader measure (M2 + CDs) actually fell by 0.4 
percent. At the same time, interest rates on time and savings deposits were falling 
sharply. The fall in these deposit rates may well reflect not loose monetary policy but 
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rather the way the wealth shock would have induced corporations and individuals 
both to try to replenish their wealth and to reduce their demand for loanable funds for 
investment in a depressed economy.25 No doubt reflecting an excess supply of savings 
(loanable funds) relative to investment, short and long lending rates were also falling 
sharply. The excess savings were also reflected in a strong balance of payments on 
current account and rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.26 Presumably, 
much of this reserve accumulation was being sterilised, for it is not reflected in the 
money supply figures.  
 
Over the next few years interest rates were to fall further. The rate on the more liquid 
savings deposits fell to a mere 0.25 percent by 1994 and then to close to zero, below 
which they cannot fall unless some sort of ‘Gesell tax’ on money balances were 
imposed to overcome the ‘zero lower bound’ problem (as suggested by Mitsuhiro 
Fukao, 2004). This appears to have had a very strong effect on the composition of 
money and ‘quasi-money’ balances. Currency plus demand deposits (M1) rose by an 
average of 7.6 percent a year over the whole period 1992-2005 while the broader (M2 
plus CDs) series rose by only 2.2 percent. With the return on savings deposits falling 
to almost the same as on demand deposits, the percentage of the latter to the former 
more than doubled – from 25.9 percent in 1992 to 54.5 percent in 2005 (see Table 1).  
 
The shifting of low-turnover savings deposits into demand deposits has meant that the 
growth of M1 is misleading. The broader (M2 + CDs) series, with its much slower 
growth, better reflects the tight monetary conditions that prevailed from 1992 until 
recently.27 The velocity of M1 declined over the period by about 7 percent a year – as 
measured by the difference between growth of M1 and growth of nominal GDP. By 
contrast, the decline in the velocity of the broader (M2 + CDs) series was more 
modest at about 2 percent a year.  
 
                                                 
25 Laidler (e.g., 2004a, 2006) has lamented the modern focus on short-term interest rates as 
the central bank’s most potent policy weapon and as the criterion of monetary looseness or 
tightness, to the relative neglect of the traditional focus on monetary aggregates.  
26 Bank of Japan (2005), pp.69-70. The foreign reserves rose by 2.7 percent in 1992, to $70 
billion, but thereafter they climbed rapidly – to $101 billion in 1993 and then to $844 billion 
by mid-2005. 
27 M2 exclusive of CDs grew slightly less fast than the (M2 + CDs) series since CDs, with 
their higher interest rate,  naturally increased more than time deposits. 
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In view of the rise in the demand for money as nominal interest rates declined, it 
would appear that the BoJ’s response to asset price deflation and economic recession 
in late 1991 and into 1992 and beyond should have been more vigorously to offset the 
deflationary effect of a rise in the demand for money to hold and the related fall in the 
demand for money to spend (that is, demand for loans). Instead, it presided over a 
sharp fall in the growth of money that was partly the result of a fall in the demand for 
loanable funds which in turn inhibits expansion of money via new bank credits.  
 
Recall that the characteristic of a Hawtreyan credit deadlock is that it prevents money 
being created, whereas a Keynesian liquidity trap suggests that even if money is 
created this would do no good by itself. But with interest rates falling to very low 
levels, many observers have concluded that the economy had fallen into a liquidity 
trap. For example, Paul Krugman (1999, p.2) argued that if, as was happening in 
Japan, “the interest rate is zero, bonds and money become in effect equivalent assets; 
so conventional monetary policy, in which money is swapped for bonds via open-
market operation, changes nothing”; and “once it became clear that the Bank of Japan 
really did consider itself unable to increase demand in an economy that badly needed 
it, it also became clear… that the theory of the liquidity trap needed a fresh, hard 
look”. He stressed that this trap “is in a fundamental sense an expectational issue. 
Monetary expansion is irrelevant [to effective demand] because the private sector 
does not expect it to be sustained”.28 His solution: influence inflationary expectations 
through an unconventional and credible commitment that the BoJ would 
uncompromisingly pursue a 15-year inflation target of 4 percent in order to reduce the 
expected real interest rate to below zero (the postulated ‘natural’ rate if prices were 
perfectly flexible) to stimulate investment and escape the liquidity trap.  
 
Kazuo Ueda (2005) suggests that Krugman’s focus on the need to manipulate 
inflationary expectations was consistent with the BoJ’s explicit commitment to an 
effectively zero (short-term) interest rate policy from early 1999 until such time as 
                                                 
28 Mauro Boianovsky’s (2004) review of the history of the liquidity trap concept lucidly 
explains John Hicks’s emphasis on expectations, and the parallels with Krugman’s view: the 
long rate of interest, and the term structure of rates, is determined by expectations about the 
future course of short-term rates. The current short rate, meanwhile, depends on the current 
supply and demand for money. But if the current rate cannot fall below zero, then it may be 
impossible to reduce the long rate, and it is the long rate that has the bigger influence on 
investment decisions, hence aggregate demand. 
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signs of inflation should appear, even when the Taylor rule might indicate the need to 
raise it. But when the economy did show signs of recovery (though with prices still 
falling) the overnight call rate was raised to 0.25 percent in August 2000. The 
recovery was short-lived and in early 2001 the policy rate was brought back down and 
a ‘quantitative easing policy’ (QEP) initiated that flooded the market with liquidity 
through aggressive purchases of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs). This generated 
a huge increase in the monetary base over the period 2001-2005. A modest but 
sustained real economic recovery was recorded at last, though consumer prices 
continued to fall until 2006.  
 
Charles Goodhart (personal communication) has suggested that this ultra-loose 
monetary policy was inefficiently implemented in that the BoJ mainly bought JGBs 
from the banks rather than the non-bank private sector. If so, this could explain why 
the banks accumulated such a huge volume of excess reserves: economic conditions 
prevented them from finding lending opportunities for these reserves – a view again 
more consistent with a credit deadlock than a liquidity trap. If instead the BoJ had 
bought JGBs directly from the non-bank private sector the latter sector, awash with 
liquidity, may have had a higher propensity to spend than if they first had to borrow 
spending money from the banks. What is required is not a massive infusion of base 
money but rather a moderate expansion of the supply of money in the hands of the 
public, at least sufficient to satisfy the modest increase in the demand for money to 
hold (decline in velocity) that has been registered during the deflationary period since 
1998 – though one would expect this decline in velocity to be reversed as and when 
deflation is conquered.. 
 
As Laidler (2004a, p.339) has argued, the Keynesian liquidity trap involved the 
demand for money becoming infinitely elastic with respect to the long not the short 
rate of interest. And in Japan (as the chart in Werner 2005, p.46 shows), the long-term 
government bond yield continued to decline, from around 5 percent in 1992 to 2 
percent in 1998 and only since then has it been flat, at around 1.5 percent. Thus for 
much of the “growth stagnation” period it would appear that an expansion of money 
by purchase of bonds could have effected a fall in the long rate of interest to stimulate 
spending rather than it all being absorbed in idle balances. However, whether in fact 
the decline in the long rate (or, for that matter, in the short rate) can be attributed to a 
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loose but ineffective monetary policy (as many aver) cannot be judged by looking 
only at the interest rate (the current preoccupation of policy-makers and theory alike, 
as lamented by Laidler 2006).  
 
For just as Hawtrey and Currie found for the United States, so too it appears that the 
rate of interest is positively and endogenously correlated with the business cycle: as 
business declines so too does the interest rate even if – or, indeed especially if – 
monetary policy is tight, as revealed not by the (lower) interest rate but by the money 
aggregates. A tight monetary policy exacerbates a downturn in business and can turn a 
recession into a self-reinforcing deflation. Thus, as revealed by the slowdown of 
nominal monetary growth at the time of the bursting of the asset price bubbles there 
was no quantitative easing at all (though at least the BoJ did not preside over an actual 
contraction of the money supply, unlike the Fed in 1929-33). Thus the subsequent 
interest rate declines can be entirely explained by a rise in the saving rate and fall in 
the demand for loanable funds. At the same time, the observed fall in the velocity of 
circulation of money indicates that while the demand for money was rising as a 
proportion of the depressed GDP, it could not have been increasing in absolute terms 
relative to the slow growth of the money supply.   
 
The question then arises: could the banks have increased the demand for loanable 
funds (hence investment and/or consumption spending) by further lowering the rate of 
interest on loans if the rate was falling precisely because macroeconomic conditions 
had been depressing that demand?29 With slower growth of money partly the result of 
a decline in demand for loanable funds relative to banks’ reserves, a reversal requires 
offsetting action by the central bank. A lowered discount rate in such circumstances 
may be an inadequate stimulus relative to the potential efficacy of open-market 
operations, as noted by Allyn Young and Lauchlin Currie in their critique of 
                                                 
29 Ronald McKinnon (2006) alludes to his well-known views on the way that an alleged 
“ever-rising yen syndrome” and international capital mobility drove Japanese interest rates to 
zero in order to satisfy the interest-parity condition when US rates were falling to around 3 
percent in the early 1990s. When after 1995 the yen ceased its secular tendency to appreciate, 
he argues that zero interest rates must now reflect a negative risk premium on Japan’s vast 
holdings of dollar assets. He does not consider whether Japan’s strong currency was a 
reflection of its tight monetary policy. 
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Hawtrey.30 Nevertheless Hawtrey too was confident that so long as a normal 
downturn of a business cycle is not allowed to develop into an abnormally severe 
depression, flooding the market with new money via open-market bond purchases 
would usually do the trick.   
 
However, we also saw that Young, Currie, Viner and others were more inclined than 
Hawtrey to call for the aid of fiscal deficits. Though Hawtrey did not rule out public 
spending to combat depression, he did insist that it would normally only work if 
financed with new money. Turning then to the role of fiscal policy in Japan’s “growth 
stagnation” since 1992, what has been the record?    
 
Lack of fiscal and monetary coordination, 1992-2005 
 
If there has been a liquidity trap at any time since 1992, conventional Keynesian 
theory suggests that fiscal deficits would boost the economy and, especially if 
sustained and large enough, could fairly quickly return the economy to full 
employment. Bank of Japan (2005, pp. 67-68) shows that the fiscal deficit rose to 3.3 
percent of GDP in the first year of recession, 1992, and to 4.3 percent in 1993 when 
economic growth was a mere 0.2 percent. The deficit rose further, to 4.6 percent and 
4.8 percent in 1994 and 1995, while the economy continued to stagnate. Between 
1996 and 2005 the deficit averaged an astonishing 6.9 percent of GDP, and the ratio 
of the national debt to GDP rose from 49.4 percent in 1991 to 160 percent in 2005, the 
highest in the developed world. Despite these unprecedented fiscal injections the 
economy remained mired in stagnation and deflation throughout. 
 
It seems safe to conclude that much of the fiscal effort was ineffective – even wasted: 
the quality of a large part of the public works has been criticised as little better than 
leaf-raking or pyramid-building (in contrast to the productivity of United States 
infrastructure projects in the 1930s, as highlighted by Alexander Field [2003]). For 
                                                 
30 Not “sound money and plenty of it” (which Laidler [2004a. p.334] referred to as the “Purvis 
principle” in the context of inflation control), but “cheap money and plenty of it” perhaps 
better reflects their advice for countering recession, or even “dear money but plenty of it”, if 
the consequence of vigorous monetary expansion would have been to avoid recession and 
thereby prevent the nominal interest rate from falling pro-cyclically. See also footnote 12 
above. 
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Keynes, useless pyramids were better than nothing for they could revive the economy 
through their indirect multiplier effects. But absent an expansion of money the 
multiplier effect would have to come entirely through an increase in the velocity of 
circulation. In the case of Japan we have, on the contrary, seen velocity declining. 
 
The deficit increased each year since 1992 by an average of about 6 percent of GDP. 
Since this was much greater than the average increase in the money supply, it is clear 
that the bulk of the deficits was financed not through the printing press (borrowing 
from the central bank), but by selling bonds to commercial banks and, mainly, to the 
non-bank private sector, especially major institutions such as large insurance 
companies, pension funds, and Japan Post.31 In this way the government was 
absorbing a very large portion of the increase in savings over the period. To the extent 
that the propensity to save was increasing faster than the private sector was willing to 
borrow or the banks to lend, the increase in relatively risk-free government bills or 
bonds can at least be credited with having prevented a Great Depression of 1930s 
proportions. But because the deficits apparently did no more than that and/or actually 
crowded out some bank lending to the private sector (either because the banks had too 
few excess reserves or because they may have lowered their risk threshold had there 
been fewer opportunities to lend to the government), they failed to prevent a Great 
Stagnation. Some deficit spending (but much less than its actual extent) may have 
been a necessary condition for recovery, but evidently not a sufficient condition. 
 
Werner (2005, ch.18) argues that fiscal policy is ineffective if it is not monetised. 
There was a notorious absence of cooperation between the Ministry of Finance and 
the Bank of Japan in the 1990s so that very little of the deficit was financed with new 
money created by the BoJ. But Werner also claims the government could have done 
more to finance the deficit through commercial bank credit creation rather than bond 
market sales to non-bank financial institutions whose liabilities are not money and 
whose loans merely transfer savings without creating new money. Reliance on 
                                                 
31 Life insurance companies, for example, increased their holdings of government bonds from 
¥8.8 trillion in 1992 to ¥39.2 trillion in 2004; Japan’s Postal Life Insurance holdings 
increased from ¥0.65 trillion to ¥55.6 trillion (Bank of Japan, 2005, p.25). Together, these 
insurance company holdings of government bonds was almost the same size as holdings by 
the BoJ (ibid., p.9). The increase of commercial bank holdings of government bonds was 
relatively small: from ¥2.7 trillion in 1992 to ¥10.2 trillion in 2004 (ibid., p.23). 
 39
commercial banks, however, also assumes they always had sufficient spare reserves 
with which to make loans to government without diverting funds from the private 
sector. It is true that during the recent period of ‘quantitative easing’ the BoJ had been 
flooding the banking system with excess reserves, but this was signally not the case in 
the 1990s.32 In this respect conditions were less propitious for stimulating the 
economy via fiscal deficits than in the United States after 1933 when the banks had 
significant excess reserves. And in any case it does not explain why Japanese banks 
were not more active in bidding for the bonds that were offered on the markets.  
 
Without fully addressing this question, Werner (2005, p.255) nevertheless insists that 
“the institutional reality of banking systems [including credit-rationing] allows banks 
to create purchasing power without withdrawing existing purchasing power from 
other parts of the economy”; and “fiscal expenditure by borrowing from banks would 
increase credit creation and hence the total amount of purchasing power in the 
economy”. He continues: 
By shifting government funding away from bond finance and replacing it with 
borrowing from the commercial banks via simple loan contracts, credit creation 
will be stimulated. Unlike bond markets, banks create new purchasing power 
when they lend. This means that overall economic activity can be boosted (via 
fiscal policy), without any quantity crowding-out that rendered fiscal policy 
ineffective during the 1990s. Banks, though risk-averse due to their bad debts, 
would not mind lending to the government – a zero-risk borrower.     
  
Werner claims (p.364) that if the banks had run up against a reserve constraint, the 
BoJ “would be forced to inject any necessary amount of liquidity in order to maintain 
its targeted call rate”.  But it is not at all clear that the BoJ did have a target call rate in 
the 1990s, except insofar as it was in continuous decline. That, in essence, appears to 
have been the problem: the BoJ was unwilling to monetise the deficit by providing the 
finance itself, but nor did it provide the commercial banks with the reserves they 
would have needed for that purpose. However, the latter, indirect method of 
monetising the deficit would need to have been at the initiative of the banks; and their 
                                                 
32 BOJ data show that excess reserves were minimal throughout the 1990s, only beginning to 
be significant from early 1999 and then extremely large after the policy of ‘quantitative 
easing’ (currently, 2006, being ended) was initiated in earnest in 2001.  
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potential bond purchases would have faced stiff competition from the non-bank 
financial intermediaries whose huge savings deposit liabilities were already sufficient 
for them to finance fiscal deficits in a non-inflationary – hence non-stimulatory – way.  
Ben Bernanke (2003) argues that greater cooperation between the BoJ and the 
Treasury, with greater BoJ purchases of government debt, could also mitigate the 
effect of deficits on the debt burden and future interest payments perceived by 
households, and so reduce any ‘Ricardian equivalence’ effect on their propensity to 
save. Another option would have been for the BoJ more comprehensively to have 
bought up the banks’ non-performing loans. As noted above, Werner persuasively 
argues that these were created at least as much because of incompetent BoJ policy as 
because of irresponsible commercial banking policy. He thus dismisses “moral 
hazard” arguments against central bank purchases of bad debts, and instead urges this 
as an effective way to increase the money supply. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, our brief survey of economic conditions in Japan after the bursting of 
asset bubbles in the early 1990s indicates that Japan’s Great Stagnation could 
probably have been avoided if a much more active monetary policy had been pursued 
after 1991. A very active fiscal policy was tried and found wanting. This suggests that 
Japan’s problem was not that she was in a conventional Keynesian liquidity trap that 
could be escaped via the activation of idle balances with little increase in the money 
supply. But compared to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the authorities at least 
ensured that there was no contraction of the money supply, hence no actual collapse 
of the economy into another Great Depression; and fiscal policy may have helped.  
 
In any case, the last word (in fact, many words) should go to David Laidler, who 
pointed out that when at last the BoJ engaged in a dramatically different, ultra-loose 
quantitative easing policy, instead of relying solely on a near-zero discount rate as a 
criterion of “easing”, prices and output at last began to show signs of recovery. He 
suggests (Laidler 2003b, p.130) that a model that puts the interaction of the supply 
and demand for money at the centre of things is much more informative about 
monetary policy’s transmission mechanism than focus on the interest rate alone: 
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Consider, for example, the currently conventional wisdom about…the zero lower 
bound problem. It might happen, and indeed in the case of contemporary Japan, 
which has much in common with the United States in 1930-33, it has happened, 
that the economy still requires monetary stimulus in a situation in which the 
nominal interest rates under the authorities’ direct control have reached zero. If all 
there was to monetary policy was shifting these rates about, then… it would be 
easy to be concluded that monetary policy had reached the limits of its powers. 
Some economists would agree with this conclusion, but most would argue, to the 
contrary, that “unconventional” methods such as open-market purchase of long 
term securities or equities might be worth trying… The express purpose of such 
methods would, of course, be to increase the quantity of money, in the hope of 
generating an excess supply thereof, and hence extra expenditure. 
 
And Laidler (2006, pp.157-58) writes that our prevailing theory of monetary policy’s 
focus on interest rates (especially when zero short-term rates are taken to indicate a 
liquidity trap) has had some odd consequences: 
To begin with, a “liquidity trap” is a state of affairs in which the demand for 
money becomes perfectly elastic with respect to a long rate of interest at some low 
positive rate of the latter. Until the policy of “quantitative easing” was begun in 
2001, the ratio of the Japanese money stock to national income… rose slowly at 
best and it was short, not long, rates of interest that were essentially zero. Given 
these facts it is hard to see what the empirical basis for the diagnosis of a liquidity 
trap could have been. On the other hand, and again before 2001, the empirical 
evidence gave no reason to reject the hypothesis that a quite separate and distinct 
phenomenon was at work, namely a Hawtreyan “credit deadlock.” Here the 
problem is not a high elasticity of the economy’s demand for money with respect 
to the long rate of interest, but a low elasticity of its demand for bank credit with 
respect to the short rate, which is a necessary prerequisite for money creation. The 
solution to a credit deadlock, as Hawtey pointed out, is vigorous open market 
operations to bring about increases in the money base and therefore the supply of 
checkable deposits, that mere manipulation of short term interest rates is usually 
sufficient to accomplish in less depressed times. 
    Now the conditions for a liquidity trap might indeed have existed in Japan in 
the 1990s. Until the credit deadlock affecting its monetary system was broken by 
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quantitative easing in 2001… it was impossible to know this. As it has happened, 
however, the subsequent up-turn of the Japanese economy that began in 2002 and 
is still proceeding is beginning to suggest that there was no liquidity trap at work 
in that economy. If further evidence bears out this conclusion, a serious policy 
error was made in the 1990s… based on a theory of monetary policy that treats the 
short interest rate as the central bank’s only tool and characterizes the 
transmission mechanism as working solely through the influence of interest rates 
on aggregate demand.  
   That theory provided no means for Japanese policy makers to distinguish 
between a liquidity trap, which is a possible feature of a demand for money 
function, and a credit deadlock, which is a characteristic of the money supply 
process, or for them to entertain the possibility that variations in the money supply 
might affect aggregate demand by channels over and above any effect on market 
rates of interest. It was therefore a dangerously defective guide to the conduct of 
monetary policy in Japan, as it is in any depressed economy. 
 
It is hoped that the present paper has offered some useful qualitative and quantitative 
evidence germane to David’s succinct statement of an important but relatively little 
researched angle on the causes of long-lasting depression and stagnation in two of the 
world’s largest economies. 
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Table 1 
 
Key Japanese statistics, 1985-2005 
 
 
 
year 
Real 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
% 
M1 
 
% 
change 
 
(1) 
M2 + CDs 
 
% change 
 
 
(2) 
M1 
 as % of  
M2 + CDs 
 
(3) 
Average 
Interest 
rate 
on time 
deposits* 
(4) 
Interest 
rate on 
ordinary  
postal 
savings 
(5) 
Inflation 
rate 
consumer 
price 
index 
(6) 
1985 5.0 4.5 9.2 28.5  2.88 1.9 
1986 2.6 8.4 8.1 28.6 5.15 1.68 0.0 
1987 4.1 6.9 11.4 27.4 4.35 1.68 0.5 
1988 6.2 10.2 10.7 27.4 4.58 1.68 0.8 
1989 4.8 -2.0 10.6 24.2 5.34 1.92 2.9 
1990 5.1 6.1 8.5 23.7 7.54 3.48 3.3 
        
1991 3.8 8.8 2.0 25.3 7.06 2.88 2.8 
1992 0.9 1.9 -0.4 25.9 4.12 1.80 1.6 
1993 0.4 3.4 1.3 26.4 2.77 1.32 1.2 
1994 1.0 4.9 2.9 26.9 2.02 1.35 0.4 
1995 2.5 12.8 3.2 29.5 1.11 0.25 -0.1 
        
1996 3.6 10.0 2.9 31.5 0.48 0.25 0.4 
1997 0.6 8.9 3.8 33.0 0.47 0.25 2.0 
1998 -0.9 5.7 3.5 33.6 0.53 0.15 0.2 
1999 0.6 11.7 2.6 36.6 0.22 0.08 -0.5 
2000 2.5 4.2 2.0 37.4 0.18 0.12 -0.5 
        
2001 -1.1 13.6 3.3 41.1 0.09 0.02 -1.0 
2002 0.8 25.1 2.2 50.3 0.04 0.005 -0.6 
2003 2.0 4.1 1.5 51.6 0.04 0.005 -0.2 
2004 1.9 4.1 2.0 52.7 0.06 0.005 -0.1 
2005 2.6 3.0 1.9 54.5 0.09 0.005 -0.1 
 
Sources:  
Bank of Japan websites:  
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/index.htm   
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/stat/dlong/fin_stat/money/index.htm 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/stat/dlong/fin_stat/money/cdab0020.csv  
Bank of Japan (2005), pp.19-20;  
United Nations Yearbooks. 
 
*   For 1986-93 the interest rate refers only to the rate on large deposits over 10 
million yen. These are usually about 1 percent above the rate for smaller 
deposits, but after 1993 there was almost no difference in the rates for 
different size of deposit. 
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